Atonement and the Death of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical, and Philosophical Exploration by William Lane Craig

 

‘‘Atonement and the Death of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical and Philosophical Exploration’’ is the result of years of study for William Lane Craig on the subject of the atonement. Cambridge University published in 2018 a shorter treatment (106 pages) by William Lane Craig on this subject called ‘‘The Atonement’’. ‘‘Atonement and the Death of Christ’’ is the more detailed treatment. The book is divided in three sections: 1) Biblical data concerning the atonement, 2) Dogmatic history of the doctrine of the atonement and 3) Philosophical reflections on the doctrine of the atonement.

In the first section, Craig deals with biblical texts related to the subject of the atonement. In chapter 1, he submits that the works of Christian philosophers on the subject have been ‘‘largely uninformed by biblical exegesis’’ and ‘‘because the biblical data concerning the atonement are so often neglected by Christian philosophers, it is imperative that we begin our investigation with a survey of some of the key biblical motifs’’ (p.8). He defines atonement as two main ideas: the expiation of sins and the reconciliation with God. In chapter 2, he deals with the notion of sacrifice. He is clear that this notion is central to the doctrine of the atonement: ‘‘the predominant motif used in the NT to characterize the atonement is the portrayal of Christ’s death as a sacrificial offering to God on our behalf’’ (p.15). The OT background for sacrificing various animal is unpacked to reveal its roots and importance. He looks at propitiatory, expiatory and Yom Kippur sacrifices. He shows that ‘‘ the animal sacrifices filled the twin fundamental purposes of expiation of sin and propitiation to God ’’ (p.18). Practices like the hand-laying on the animal and the concept of ransoming are also explained. Lastly, he addresses the NT treatment of sacrifice and concludes that ‘‘the NT writers think of Christ’s death as both expiatory and propitiatory ’’ (p.33).

Chapter 3 looks at the suffering servant of Isaiah 53. He shows that this passage is key to understanding the role of Christ as the righteous Servant who suffered in the place of sinners, bearing the punishment they deserved, so that they might be reconciled to God. He says ‘‘while atonement vocabulary is not used in Isaiah 53, the concept is clearly present’’ (p.44). He concludes the chapter by showing how NT writers refer to the suffering servant portrayed in Isaiah 53.

Chapter 4 deals with the role of divine justice in the act of atonement. He spend most of the chapter doing an exposition of a key atonement passage (Romans 3:21-26) by focusing on notions like ‘‘the righteousness of God’’, ‘‘redemption’’, ‘‘propitiation’’ and ‘‘blood’’. He also responds to the New Perspective on Paul and critique the idea that God’s righteousness is equivalent to his covenant faithfulness. He asserts that ‘‘if one reduces God’s righteousness to his covenant faithfulness, this will radically impact one’s understanding of Paul’s atonement doctrine. For then justification is not about God’s reckoning us to be guiltless by the standard of divine justice but about God’s reckoning to us covenant faithfulness, which makes dubious sense and in any case would not avail for salvation’’ (p.55).

In chapter 5 he looks at two other facets of the doctrine of atonement: representation and redemption. In the former is the idea of Christ being our representative before God. He describes two ways in which he is our representative: in the corporate solidary of all mankind with Christ and in the union of believers with Christ, whereby they become the beneficiaries of his atoning death. He says ‘‘Christ’s atoning death is thus offered on behalf of all mankind, represented by Christ before God, thereby making divine pardon and justification available to all, but actual redemption of various individuals takes place over time throughout history as people come to place their faith in Christ and receive God’s gift of righteousness ’’ (p.85). He then looks at redemption and shows how it means to be set free from the bondage of sin and its consequences.

In section 2, Craig looks at church history and examines the different atonement theories that have been proposed. He quotes extensively from Christian writers ranging from early church fathers to reformers. He says: ‘‘We do not pretend to survey adequately the history of the development of this doctrine; comprehensives histories have already been written. Rather our aim is simply to highlight some of the principal theories of the atonement that have been offered throughout church history up until the modern period’’ (p.91).

In chapter 6, he deals with patristic theories on the atonement. He quotes Origen, Eusebius, John Chrysostom, Irenaeus, Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine and shows how those early writers accepted concepts related to the atonement such as imputation of our sins to Christ, substitutionary punishment for our sins, satisfaction of divine justice, sacrificial offering to God and redemption. He describes how some of the Fathers adhere to the Christus Victor theory of the atonement which affirms that ‘‘the sacrifice of Christ’s life served to deliver mankind from bondage to Satan and from the corruption and death that are the consequences of sin. Sometimes, as in Origen’s case, the Fathers interpreted Jesus’ ransom saying very literally to mean that Christ’s life was a payment to Satan in exchange for human beings’’ (p.101). He’s not convinced by this theory alone: ‘‘Taken alone, Christus Victor not only ignores important NT atonement motifs, but it also fails of explanatory sufficiency, for it offers nothing to explain how God’s vanquishing Satan achieves forgiveness of sin and reconciliation with God’’ (p.111). He does however think that the theory has some helpful notions: ‘‘Anyone aspiring to articulate a biblically adequate atonement theory will want to include Christ Victor as a facet of that theory’’ (p.112).  

Chapter 7 looks at medieval theories. The first one is the satisfaction theory developed by Anselm. Craig describes it this way: ‘‘On Anselm’s view Christ does not die in our place or pay the penalty for our sin; rather he offers a compensation to God on our behalf (…) Anselm says that divine justice requires God the Father to reward the Son for the gift of his life. But how can a reward be bestowed on someone who needs nothing and owes nothing? The Son therefore gives the reward to those for whose salvation he became incarnate. He remits the debt incurred by their sins and bestows on them the beatitude they had forfeited’’ (p.118). He also describes Aquinas view of the satisfaction theory that differs slightly from Anselm’s view.  He then moves to the moral influence theory first developed by Peter Abelard. He summarized the theory this way: ‘‘Christ’s death achieved our reconciliation with God not by offering some compensation to God or ransoming us from the devil but by moving our hearts to contrition and love as we contemplate Christ voluntarily embracing horrible suffering and death. Nothing actually transpired between God and man at Jesus’ crucifixion. No debt was paid, no sins were punished. The entire power of the cross to achieve reconciliation lies in its exemplary force to produce a subjective impact on us’’ (p.121). He comes to the conclusion that the moral influence theory does not ‘‘do justice to the NT data concerning God’s wrath, Christ’s substitutionary death, justification, and so on ’’ (p.123).

Chapter 8 is dedicated to reformation and post-reformation theories which are the penal substitution theory and the governmental theory. As for the penal substitution theory, he summarizes it this way: ‘‘Christ voluntarily bore the suffering that we were due as the punishment for our sins. There is therefore no longer any punishment due to those who are the beneficiaries of Christ’s death. God’s wrath is propitiated by Christ’s substitutionary death, for the demands of divine justice have been met’’ (p.125). He quotes Reformers such as Luther, Calvin and especially Turretin. He spends some time analyzing Socinus’ critique of penal substitution and shows how those Reformers responded to him. He then describes the governmental theory associated with Grotius and his defense of penal substitution. He concludes that ‘‘Grotius’s rich treatise, from which we have but sampled, remains essential reading for any atonement theorist today’’ (p.142).

Chapter 9 starts the third section of the book. In this chapter he deals with critiques of penal substitution indicating that the theory is incoherent. He focuses on two critiques. The first one is from Mark C. Murphy who claims that if Christ was sinless, God could not have condemned nor punished him. The problem with Murphy’s objection according to Craig, lies primarily in the way he defines punishment. The second critique is from Eleonore Stump who challenges the theological coherence by claiming that the theory is incompatible with God’s love and forgiveness. Craig lists two problems with this objection. He says that ‘‘it is not true that God, as characterized by penal substitutionary atonement theories, fails to be perfectly loving and forgiving’’ (p.166). The second problem is that Stump’s ‘‘entire approach to the doctrine of the atonement is based on construing God on the analogy of a private party involved in various personal relationships rather than as a Judge and Ruler’’ (p.167). Craig concludes that neither of these two critiques can be retained as a good argument against penal substitution.

Chapter 10 deals with critiques of substitutionary atonement that posit that the theory is unjust and immoral. Some suggest that if God is just, it’s an injustice on God’s part to punish Christ, an innocent, in our place. He answers the critiques involking concepts from the philosophy of law like retributive and consequentialist theories of justice, justification of punishment, legal fictions and vicarious liability. Craig concludes by saying that each of these critiques ‘‘fails to show any injustice in God’s punishing Christ in our place’’ (p.193)

Chapter 11 is about the relation of atonement to the satisfaction of divine justice (i.e. the notion of propitiation). He starts by dealing with an objection from Socinus who contends that punishing Christ in our place cannot meet the demands of divine retributive justice. Craig returns to the subject of vicarious liability from the previous chapter (p.186-193) and considers whether any analogy to penal substitution exists in our secular justice system. He purports that there is, especially in the Anglo-American justice system, such as a blameless employer or corporation being held vicariously liable for crimes committed by employees. Craig provides examples to respond to objectors’ claim that only the wrongdoer is punished for his wrong in our legal system, not to try to ‘‘construct a doctrine of the atonement based on human justice systems’’ (p.201). He also adresses about the question of substitution and representation. He affirms with Turretin that ‘‘Christ, in bearing our punishment, was both our substitute and our representative before God’’ (p.204). ‘‘For Christ’s being divinely and voluntarily appointed to act not merely as our substitute but as our representative enables him to serve as our proxy before God, so that when he is punished, we are punished by proxy, to the satisfaction of divine justice’’ (p.207). He then deals with a second objection to the satisfaction of divine justice by Eleonore Stump who claims that ‘‘the penal substitution theory of the atonement does not, in fact, present God as foregoing what is owed him because of human sin’’ (p.208). He concludes that ‘‘we should not, in any case, think of our sinful condition primarily on the analogy of the debt owed by a debtor to a creditor nor of God’s forgiveness in terms of remission of a debt, rather, our condition is like that of a condemned criminal before the court and divine forgiveness like a legal pardon’’ (p.214).

The next two chapters are spent on the subject of redemption. Chapter 12 focuses on divine pardon and its effects. He uses analogies of pardon within justice systems. He clearly affirms that ‘‘there will be significant disanalogies between divine pardon and the pardoning power as it exists in Anglo-American systems of justice (…) but, still, given the similarities, we may expect to gain a good deal of insight into divine pardon by exploring the pardoning power vested in heads of government’’ (p.218).  He looks at the concept and the definition of pardon by referring to past legal cases. He takes some time arguing about whether a pardon serves to remove the criminal guilt. He refers to a Supreme Court case called ‘‘Ex parte Garland’’ that declared: ‘‘A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense’’ (p.222). That doesn’t mean that the pardon can erase from the past a person’s wrongful action. ‘‘It recognizes that the offender was guilty, but as a result of his pardon he is now innocent in the law’s eyes’’ (p.229-230). Craig sees this as a ‘‘marvelous description of divine pardon’’ (p.222). He ends with an analogy on the effect of divine pardon: ‘‘our legal pardon by God no more transforms our character and makes us virtuous people than does a human pardon a convicted criminal. Again and again, the courts have insisted that a person may suffer various disabilities, despite his pardon, because of the flawed character that led to his conviction. The conviction alone, now pardoned, may not serve as grounds of disability, but it may serve as evidence of a corrupt character and conduct that are disabling (…) Similarly, while a divine pardon makes us legally innocent before God, free of liability of punishment, it is powerless of itself to effect moral transformation of character. To that end we need regeneration through the Holy Spirit and His sanctifying influence to make us over time into the men and women that God wants us to be’’ (p.234-235).

Chapter 13 is about the justification and appropriation of the pardon. He looks at some other legal cases, from a retributivist perspective to see under what conditions is a pardon justified and under what conditions it is not justified. He then makes the comparison with the God of the Bible: ‘‘The claim of pure retributivist has enormous theological implications for divine pardon. For God is portrayed as acting mercifully toward us and his pardoning our sins as an act of grace. (…) At the same, the Bible portrays God as a positive retributivist with respect to justice (Exodus 34:7)’’ (p.242). He upholds that both attributes are not a contradiction on God’s part: “Justification should not, contrary to careless statements by some NT scholars, be thought to be a verdict of acquittal. The guilty verdict stands. But as Ruler God pardons us, so that whereas we were once guilty, we are now innocent before Him. God as Ruler thus does not contradict what he as Judge as determined’’ (p.243). He then asserts with Anselm and the Reformers that the satisfaction of divine justice is a necessary condition of salvation. The second part of the chapter is about the appropriation of the pardon. He asks ‘‘whether a pardon, to be effective, must be accepted by the criminal who is the intended beneficiary’’ (p.249). Based on various legal cases, he deems that ‘‘the courts remain unclear on whether a pardon requires acceptance in order to be efficacious’’ (p.256). He finally moves to the theological application and concludes that ‘‘a divine pardon, then, can be granted on the conditions of repentance and faith. If God desires people to come freely into his kingdom, then he may offer his pardon to everyone who will freely accept it. Anyone who refuses a divine pardon therefore remains guilty before God’s bar and so liable to punishment’’ (p.256-257).

Chapter 14 is about the usefulness of the moral influence theory of the atonement. He already explained the theory is chapter 7 where he considers it insufficient on its own. He says in this chapter that ‘‘taken in isolation, the moral theory is hopeless as an atonement theory. Not only it is biblically inadequate, but (…) it is powerless to explain how redemption is accomplished for all those who lived prior to the time of Christ and who had no expectation of his coming, upon whom his death had therefore no influence whatsoever’’ (p.259). Yet he also states that ‘‘a multifaceted theory of the atonement should also include the moral influence of Christ’s death upon humanity, which helps to draw people to faith in Christ and to persevere in faith through trial and even martyrdom’’ (p.259). He believes that the theory play a role in the life of a person, to encourage certain actions and discourage others. He discusses about ways in which it discourages persistence in a state of alienation from God but also encourages sinner to embrace God’s offer of forgiveness.

 

Assessment

William Lane Craig has written an important book on the subject of the atonement. The level of research that he did to write this book is truly impressive. The amount of footnotes and interaction with other writers shows that he took serious time to deal with the data and with objections to his view. First off, I have to say that this is the first book that I read that is dedicated to the subject of the atonement. I’m a theology student. I had some notions on the subject prior to this book but nothing advanced. So what I write is not an in depth review. I can’t allege to be able to spot flaws in Craig’s view and provide a detailed appreciation. I leave that to seasoned scholars, because, yes, for those who wonder, this is a very scholarly work.

Leaning on my protestant roots, I tend to agree with Craig that penal substitution is the centre of the theory of the atonement. Any book on the atonement trying to put aside penal substitution will have a hard time surviving criticism. I think Craig has done a great job of defending it. Craig have sometimes been criticised by Christians for putting philosophy ahead of theology in his argumentations. Whether this critique is accurate or not, Christians can give him credit for beginning his survey with biblical data and for stressing that it’s the most important aspect of the study. He is quick to emphasize that a theory of the atonement cannot be a Christian theory if it is not backed up with biblical data.

This first part of the book, the biblical data, is useful to establish the meaning of the atonement as both expiation and propitiation. This section is the most accessible of the book. In my opinion, his examination of the OT as the background for the atonement, especially in relation to the various sacrifices, was thorough and helpful. However, I wish he would have gone in more detail with the NT data. He spends more time in the OT than in the NT, although the NT has a greater depth on the subject. I understand that his intention was not to do an exhaustive study of the biblical data and a deep exegesis of the passages but I feel there was a missed opportunity to delve deeper into the NT and expound on the correlations between OT and NT.

In the second part, I think he did a good job of looking at the various atonement theories that have been proposed down the ages. He spent most of the chapters presenting the views of the adherents and their opponents rather than giving his opinion. He very skillfully interacted with the proponents of the theories. You can clearly see that he read those ancient authors and immersed himself in their ideas. By doing this he seems to have fairly represented them. He is able to recognize when there are misrepresentations of the views, which is usually a sign of a good appropriation of a view. He is also able to appreciate the theories even if he doesn’t ascribe fully to them. I agree with him that the various atonement theories can be used to construct what he calls a ‘‘multifaceted theory of the atonement’’. They all have useful notions that help to describe the atonement in different aspects. He was able for example to offer good practical applications of the moral influence theory even though it is the least attractive theory as a whole. On the other hand, I found the text to be at times dense and hard to follow, especially when he discussed opposing views to the theories. It was sometimes difficult to understand the main ideas of the atonement theories. I had this impression especially in the description of the governmental theory. Apart from that, I think he submitted a good presentation and analysis of the atonement theories.

The third part of the book, the defense of the coherence of penal substitution from a philosophical standpoint, was the most challenging part to read. It is the most detailed and difficult section of the book. The analogies that Craig makes between penal substitution and notions from philosophy of law are truly what sets him apart from other writers on the subject. There probably exists no book with that depth that is able to deal as much with philosophical law notions and apply them to the atonement. The amount of sources that he interacts with is indeed impressive. His quotations and footnotes are, again, very detailed. If you’d like to know more about notions of law  like crime, guilt, punishment, pardon, retributive and consequentialist theories of justice, legal fictions, vicarious liability then this part will interest you. He also deals extensively with opposing views and debates on these subjects. The perseverant layman should be able to go through the chapters. But, for many readers, the details might be overwhelming.

Craig says in that third part that he doesn’t give analogies from philosophy of law to try to ‘‘construct a doctrine of the atonement based on human justice systems (…) one is not engaged in such a silly project. Theological construction of a doctrine of the atonement will be based on the teaching of Scripture. Rather (…) one is merely offering a defeater of the objection raised to penal substitution that it is unsatisfactory’’ (p.201) because it goes against our penal system of justice. He also upholds its usefulness with, for example, the subject of punishment: ‘‘Still, legal theorists and philosophers of law have for several centuries poured an enormous amount of thought into the theory of punishment, and so, given the widespread presence of forensic and judicial motifs in the biblical texts pertinent to the atonement, we may expect to learn a great deal from them’’ (p.150). So some technical details in this section will be of interest for the critique of penal substitution, but could also be useful for Christians to enrich their understanding of the atonement.  As a Christian, I cannot say that these analogies with our penal system were really eye opening and enlightening in my understanding of the atonement. I did find some sections informative and insightful, while I sometimes had a hard time following Craig’s discourse. It could certainly be a lack of understanding on my part. I can understand that some individuals appreciate the analogies and that it gives them a richer view of atonement. I think this section is more useful for those who critique the penal substitution theory of the atonement. I think Craig made a very persuasive case to defend the coherence and rationality of the theory from its critics.

Overall, ‘‘Atonement the Death of Christ’’ is an interesting book on the subject of the atonement. The three areas of study (biblical, historical and philosophical) give a wider and fuller treatment of the subject of the atonement. The philosophical section is really ground-breaking. His combination of philosophy of law and biblical atonement is truly unique and I believe it will open the door to more study on these subjects.